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COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE
Nancy Leong* & Joanne Morando
ABSTRACT
This Article examines a problem in cybercrime law that is
both persistent and pervasive. What counts as “communication” on
the Internet? Defining the term is particularly important for crimes
such as cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and cyberbullying, where
most statutes require a showing that the alleged perpetrator
“communicated” with the victim or impose a similar requirement
through slightly different language.
This Article takes up the important task of defining
communication. As a foundation to our discussion, we provide the
first comprehensive survey of state statutes and case law relating to
cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and cyberbullying. We then
examine the realities of the way people use the Internet to develop
a definition of “communication” that reflects those realities. That
is, we aim to provide effective tools by which prosecutors can
address wrongful conduct without punishing innocuous behavior
or chilling speech. We conclude by proposing a model statute that
appropriately defines “communication.” We recommend that state
legislatures adopt the statute or modify existing laws to match it in
pertinent part and demonstrate how the statute would apply in a
range of situations.
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INTRODUCTION
“Elizabeth Long needs to stop bitching about how she
almost killed herself and go ahead and do it.”1 This message was
posted anonymously and broadcast over a 1.5-mile radius, reaching
thousands of individuals who had downloaded an app called Yik
Yak.2 During a series of events that would become known as
GamerGate, Zoe Quinn was forced to leave her home, fearing for
her safety, after her address was posted online.3 This act of
revealing personal information and documents to the public online
is called “doxxing,” and it has become increasingly common in
recent years.4 Brianna Wu, who owns a video game company,
woke up to the following message posted to Twitter: “Guess what
bitch? I now know where you live. You and Frank [her husband]
live at [REDACTED].”5 A fake Twitter account titled “Anita
Needs to Die” features a profile picture of Anita Sarkeesian, a
feminist commentator, with photoshopped black eyes and a bloody
nose.6
In the past, statutes criminalizing behavior such as threats,
stalking, and harassment generally require that the speaker
1
Alyson Shontell, How Two Georgia Fraternity Brothers Created Yik Yak, a
Controversial App That Became a ~$400 Million Business in 365 Days,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/theinside-story-of-yik-yak-2015-3.
2
Id.
3
Alex Hern, Zoe Quinn on Gamergate: ‘We Need a Proper Discussion
About Online Hate Mobs,’ THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/12/zoe-quinn-gamergateonline-hate-mobs-depression-quest.
4
Id.
5
Ian Miles Cheong, Game Developer Brianna Wu Driven From Home After
Death
Threats
and
Doxxing,
GAMERANX
(Oct.
10,
2014),
http://www.gameranx.com/updates/id/24642/article/game-developer-briannawu-driven-from-home-after-death-threats-and-doxxing/.
In
almost
all
republications and screenshots of doxxing occurrences, the information at issue
has been removed or redacted to avoid further dispersing the private
information.
6
Since deleted, a screen capture can be found at Carly Smith, GamerGate: A
War on Women Hiding Behind a Mask of “Ethics,” INDIEWIRE (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://blogs.indiewire.com/womenandhollywood/gamergate-a-war-on-womenhiding-behind-a-mask-of-ethics-20141017.
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“communicate” with the target. It is easy to establish that
communication took place when the behavior takes the form of a
phone call or letter directly to the target. But the Internet, along
with various social media platforms and apps, have enabled other
forms of directing abuse at targets in which “communication”
cannot be defined simply as direct messages from one person to
another. Understanding the ways people communicate on the
Internet is vitally important to creating laws that regulate harmful
online speech and conduct.
In this Article, we present an original empirical survey and
analysis of three types of such laws in the federal code and all fifty
states: cyberstalking laws, which prohibit a pattern of online
behavior that poses a credible threat of harm;7 cyberharassment
laws, which prohibit online activity that torments or distresses its
target;8 and cyberbullying laws, which generally refer to
harassment and bullying among minors.9 These three categories of
laws are related and often overlap, so the distinction among them is
not always clear. More importantly, however, all three are intended
to address essentially the same problem: the use of the Internet to
engage in speech and behavior that seriously damage people’s
lives.
When we consider the behavior that these laws are
designed to prevent, the need to define communication becomes
clear. For example, a law designed to prohibit cyberharassment
7

See Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Jan.
12,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/cyberstalking-and-cyberharassment-laws.aspx
8
See id.
9
See id. We did not engage in a census of state cyberbullying laws for
purposes of this project, although other commentators have systematically
examined such laws. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating CyberVictimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1122 (2011); Alison Virginia
King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online
Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 857–
64 (2010). Our conclusions about what should count as communication for
purposes of cyberstalking and cyberharassment statutes would, however, apply
equally well to cyberbullying statutes, perhaps with the addition of forums
unique to minors (for example, an intranet message board available exclusively
to students at a particular school).
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would be essentially useless if its scope was limited to emails. A
harasser has many other ways of communicating with a target,
such as Facebook posts and messages, Tweets, blog posts, and
blog comments. At the same time, a law designed to prohibit
cyberharassment would be decidedly overbroad—and would
violate the First Amendment—if it prohibited all negative speech
about an individual on the Internet.
Our project, then, is to develop a definition of
communication that will allow for the punishment of harmful
speech without sweeping in innocuous speech or running afoul of
the First Amendment. There are, of course, other issues necessary
to resolve to draft cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes—for
example, the mental state necessary for criminalization, the
frequency and severity of harmful speech, and the effect of such
speech on the victim. But defining what “communication” means
in the online world is uniquely critical for cyberharassment
statutes, as the other elements are, for the most part, well defined
by other areas of criminal law that use the same or similar
standards.
We conclude that “communication” on the Internet should
be defined as any online behavior—including, but not limited to,
speech—by an individual that the individual either knew the target
would discover or recklessly disregarded a reasonable likelihood
that the target would discover. We select the standard for a number
of reasons. First, we think it appropriate to hold individuals liable
for behavior that they know or are reckless in ignoring that the
target of the behavior would discover. The use of a recklessness
standard with respect to an individual’s mental state strikes a
balance between a standard requiring actual knowledge—which
would in many instances be very difficult for the prosecution to
prove—and mere negligence—which risks criminalizing
accidental behavior. By defining a communication as behavior
performed with reckless disregard for the likelihood that the target
will find out about it, we sweep in behavior that an individual
knew the target of the behavior would discover, as well as behavior
that an individual consciously disregarded the likelihood that the
target would discover.
Moreover, this approach is consonant with the Supreme
Court’s questioning during oral argument for Elonis v. United
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States,10 which was argued in December and in which the Supreme
Court’s decision is currently pending.11 Elonis involved a man who
made violent statements about his ex-wife on Facebook.12 The
statements would have caused a reasonable person to fear for her
safety, and Elonis was convicted under the federal threats statute.13
The issue in Elonis, then, is whether the government must prove
that the perpetrator intended to threaten the target, or whether it is
enough to show that a reasonable target would have felt threatened
and that this target in fact felt threatened. At oral argument, the
Justices seemed skeptical that the prosecution would have to prove
intent to threaten, with Justice Alito noting that to do so “sounds
like a roadmap for threatening a spouse and getting away with it.”14
Justice Kagan instead suggested a recklessness standard, which
would be easier for the prosecution to prove.15
Elonis does not directly implicate our purpose in this
Article. Rather, it speaks to whether a perpetrator intends
statements to threaten, while our concern is with whether a
perpetrator intends or ignores the likelihood that statements will be
seen by the subject. We think, however—and will explain in more
detail in the body of the Article—that a consistent recklessness
standard creates an appropriate parallel between the intent
requirement associated with the intent to threaten or engage in
other harmful speech and the intent requirement associated with
the communication itself.16

10

730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument Analysis: Taking Ownership of an
Internet
Rant,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Dec.
1,
2014),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/argument-analysis-taking-ownership-of-aninternet-rant/ (recapping oral argument of Elonis before the Supreme Court).
12
Elonis 730 F.3d at 323.
13
18 U.S.C. § 875 (2012); Elonis, 730 F.3d at 323.
14
Transcript of Oral Argument at 59 lines 20–22, Elonis v. United States
(2014),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13983_4f57.pdf.
15
Id. at 8 lines 16–21.
16
To the extent that the Elonis decision does overlap with our current
prescription, we may revise the Article slightly. Such overlap is highly unlikely
given that an entirely different element of the crime is at issue, but even dicta
11
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Finally, a note about terminology: While our survey of state
laws and cases examines the way that communication is defined
for cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes, we will use the
term “cyberharassment” to refer collectively to both of these types
of statutes. When we are referring only to cyberharassment
statutes, and not to cyberstalking statutes, we will make that clear
in individual instances. In some cases, our analysis will also apply
to cyberbullying statutes, given that those statutes also deal with
what constitutes electronic communication, although we did not
specifically examine those statutes in our empirical survey. We
note where our discussion extends to cyberbullying statutes as
well.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the
importance of defining “communication” on the Internet. We
survey the relevant scholarly literature on electronic
communication, noting that no previous work has examined in
detail what it means to communicate on the Internet in light of the
myriad ways of doing so. We then examine the realities of how
people use the Internet to convey information to one another and
explain what it should mean to “communicate” online in light of
these realities.
In Part II, the Article undertakes an original empirical
survey of statutes criminalizing cyberharassment, taking stock of
the way that “communication” is currently statutorily defined and
judicially interpreted. We first survey the way communication is
defined in state statutes relating to cyberharassment and develop a
typology of such statutes. We then examine the way that state
courts have interpreted the meaning of communication according
to these statutes.
Finally, Part III develops an agenda for implementing a
better definition of communication. We point out the defects in
existing laws, describe how they can be ameliorated, and propose
statutory language that legislators should use in passing new
cyberharassment statutes or amending old ones. Ultimately, these
proposals will yield cyberharassment laws that accurately reflect
the way that people use the Internet.
from the Supreme Court may provide an interesting addition to our analysis
here.
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I. WHAT QUALIFIES AS COMMUNICATION?
This Part considers what should count as “communication”
on the Internet. It surveys the existing scholarly literature, which
has not examined this issue in great detail. It then examines the
way that people use the Internet, taking account of existing
technology in a way that neither scholars nor judges have thus far.
Ultimately, we adopt a practical definition of “communication”
based in the way people actually transmit and receive information
via the Internet.
A. A Neglected Element of Cyberharassment
The evolution of cyberharassment law has presented many
novel issues for legal debate, including questions of
constitutionality,17 burdens of proof,18 and the feasibility of
17

Considerable scholarship focuses on what is necessary to make such
cyberharassment statutes compliant with the requirements of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Andrew B. Carrabis & Seth D. Haimovitch,
Cyberbullying: Adaptation from the Old School Sandlot to the 21st Century
World Wide Web—The Court System and Technology Law’s Race to Keep Pace,
16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 143 (2011) (analyzing First Amendment concerns of
Florida’s cyberbullying laws in contrast to the seminal cases of free speech in
public schools); Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to
Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693 (2012) (presenting “a First
Amendment primer to guide law-makers); Ari Ezra Waldman, Hostile
Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705 (2012) (discussing the
interaction of the First Amendment and a school’s ability to punish off-campus
cyberbullying); Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying
Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63
VAND. L. REV. 845 (2010) (offering “suggestions for how cyberbullying laws
can be crafted to address the problem of online bullying while not eroding First
Amendment Freedoms”).
18
See, e.g., David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart,
Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 745 (discussing Fourth Amendment implications in securing
evidence of cybercrime); Aimee Fukuchi, Note, A Balance of Convenience: The
Use of Burden-Shifting Devices in Criminal Cyberharassment Law, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 289 (2011) (proposing burden-shifting devices because the prosecution is
procedurally disadvantaged in proving the details of the crime that are
“peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused”); Kori Clanton, We Are Not
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implementation.19 While each of these considerations is essential to
the formation of the law, we must still ask a foundational question:
what specific conduct is the legislature trying to criminalize? The
answer to that question lies in how we define communication, or,
put differently, what it means to communicate online.
Policy makers and scholars have considered two different
approaches to defining communication. The first is target-centric—
it examines how the target of the communication is affected or
reached by that communication. The second is speaker-centric—it
examines the means or platform that the speaker uses to
communicate. Yet a clear definition of communication requires
both understandings.
In a target-centric discussion of cyberharassment, the focus
is on the wide variety of ways that harassers can harm their
targets.20 Targets can be directly harassed or threatened by one
Who We Pretend to Be: ODR Alternatives to Online Impersonation Statutes, 16
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 323, 340–41 (2014) (noting the difficulty in the
plaintiff or victim having the burden of identifying a perpetrator that operated in
anonymity).
19
We note, moreover, that while many student authors have made interesting
and relevant contributions relating to feasibility of implementation, the issue is
lacking in commentary by established academics and practitioners. See, e.g.,
Cassie Cox, Protecting Victims of Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment, and Online
Impersonation Through Prosecutions and Effective Laws, 54 JURIMETRICS J.
277 (2014) (noting the difficulties in proving the required culpable mental state);
Heather Benzmiller, Note, The Cyber-Samaritans: Exploring Liability for the
“Innocent” Bystanders of Cyberbullying, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 927 (2013)
(discussing the need to criminalize the role of the bystander that escalates the
cyberbullying); Arthur Gaus, Comment, Trolling Attacks and the Need for New
Approaches to Privacy Torts, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 353 (2012) (proposes that a tort
regime be the primary way to deal with cyberharassment as the internet
anonymity makes traditional criminal culpability difficult); Kate E. Schwartz,
Note, Criminal Liability for Internet Culprits: The Need for Updated State Laws
Covering the Full Spectrum of Cyber Victimization, 87 WASH U. L. REV. 407
(2009) (noting the myriad types of cyber victimization and proposing a
legislative scheme that anchors liability to the culprit’s intent and the harm the
victim suffered).
20
See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 29
(2014) (discussing cyberharassment’s ability to affect the “victims’ professional
reputations and careers, discourage[e] on- and offline pursuits, disrupt[] both
crucial and ordinary life choices, and cause[] physical and emotional harm”);
Cassie Cox, Protecting Victims of Cyberstalking, Cyberharassment, and Online
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person.21 Or the harassment can be indirect.22 Jacqueline Lipton
notes that “cyberbullying comes in a variety of different forms, not
all of which involve direct communications with the victim. . . .
[O]ne key difference between victimizing an individual in the real
world and online is that the victim is not always the direct recipient
of the threatening or harassing communications.”23 A
cyberharasser can recruit friends or other online networks to target
their attack,24 assuming that the content of the interaction will find
its way to the intended target.25 The target’s personal information
can be revealed online.26 A cyberharasser could post false
Impersonation Through Prosecutions and Effective Laws, 54 JURIMETRICS J.
277, 277 (2014) (noting that “cyberstalkers can use a wider range of methods,
from tracking victims through social media to impersonating targeted
individuals”).
21
Direct harassment was at issue in the Elonis case. United States v. Elonis,
730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013). Elonis posted violent statements about his ex-wife,
including “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and
dying from all the little cuts.” Id. at 325.
22
Indirect cyberharassment has very little in common with real world
harassing activities. See Lipton, supra note 9, at 1112.
23
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberbullying and the First Amendment, 14 FLA.
COSTAL L. REV. 99, 105 (2012).
24
For a discussion of the unique ways the internet encourages harmful
group-think see Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening
Speech On-Line Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True
Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 82 (2002).
25
One reporter described this as “crowd-sourced revenge” when her number
was posted on Craigslist in the personals section, leading to hours of people
calling her. Kashmir Hill, What Are the Legal Penalties For Using Craigslist To
Crowd-Source
Revenge?,
FORBES
(Sept.
08,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/08/what-are-the-legalpenalties-for-using-craigslist-to-crowd-source-revenge/. Most infamous was the
case of an ex-boyfriend posting to Craigslist under the guise of his ex-girlfriend
seeking to play out a rape fantasy. Kashmir Hill, A Reason Not to Respond to
Rape Fantasy Ads on Craigslist, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/02/a-reason-not-to-respond-to-rape-fantasy-adson-craigslist/. Tragically, the ad asked for and attracted “real aggressive man
with no concern for women” who raped the woman. Id.
26
This phenomenon, known as doxxing, became the focus of
cyberharassment debate following GamerGate in 2014. “[D]oxxing[] involves
scouring the Internet for personal data (or documents, the source of the word
“doxx”)—like a person’s name, address, occupation, Twitter or Facebook
profile—and then publicly [posting] that information.” Emily Bazelon, The
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information under the target’s name.27 Some of this conduct is
online behavior that leads to offline harassment.28
The most common approach to defining online
communication involves an examination of the means or platform
that the speaker is using to engage in speech or other online
behavior. For example, one scholar defines cyberharassment as
speech channeled through “emails, blogs, instant messenger
messages, text or video messages, chat rooms, on-line social
networks, or other websites.”29 Yet even this definition from three
years ago is outdated as it does not include app-based technology.
As technology has evolved it is clear that cyberstalking cannot be
limited to email or other “one-on-one private forums” as it once
Online
Avengers,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Jan.
15,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/magazine/the-online-avengers.html?_r=0.
In the 2014 GamerGate controversy, many outspoken female gamers,
developers, and activists were doxxed as retaliation for their public stances on
GamerGate. See Alex Hern, Felicia Day’s Public Details Put Online After She
Described
Gamergate
Fears,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
23,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/23/felicia-days-public-detailsonline-gamergate (minutes after Felicia Day posted about Gamergate, her
address and personal email was posted in the comments section to her original
post). Though not relevant to our discussion here, there has been some
interesting debate over the social utility for doxxing, as a way to publicly shame
poor behavior (or at least what the online community views as poor behavior).
See Emily Bazelon, The Online Avengers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/magazine/the-online-avengers.html.
27
Some victims reach the point that they have to include a disclaimer on
their resume, explaining the negative results the employer will find should they
Google their name. See Danielle Keats Citron, How Cyber Mobs and Trolls
Have Ruined the Internet—And Destroyed Lives, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.newsweek.com/internet-and-golden-age-bully-271800 (describing
Anna Mayer’s issues with cyberharassment, which got to the point that “75
percent of the links appearing on the first page of a search of her name were the
attack sites and disparaging posts”).
28
See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2007)
(describing various methods of cyberharassment); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012) (noting the many ways that
cyberharassers can reach their targets); Catherine E. Smith, Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress: An Old Arrow Targets the New Head of the Hate Hydra,
80 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2002).
29
Bradford W. Reyns et al., Stalking in the Twilight Zone: Extent of
Cyberstalking Victimization and Offending Among College Students, 33
DEVIANT BEHAV. 1, 1, (2012).
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was.30 The original laws concerning cyberstalking and
cyberharassment usually drew parallels to offline conduct
criminalized under stalking and harassment laws, and in some
instances drew the exact language from those statutes.
It is important to define communication as it relates to
cyberactivity to prevent the all-too-easy comparison to real world
criminalized activities. Lipton notes the difficulty in analogizing
some types of online communication to offline analogs. For
example, one might argue that gathering on a social networking
site such as Facebook to make fun of a cyberbullying victim is
analogous to gossiping about the victim out of her earshot.31 Yet
Lipton explains that the analogy is imperfect: “online conduct has
the potential to be cut-and-pasted all over the Internet, so it is
much more likely that a victim could ultimately access a transcript
even when that person is not the intended recipient of the
communications.”32 Likewise, the harm of online bullying is in
some ways greater: “One feature of online communications is their
tendency to become permanent viral records of comments about an
individual.”33 As Amy Harmon observes, the myriad forms of
communication available on the Internet enable cyberbullies “to be
both less obvious to adults and more publicly humiliating, as
gossip, put-downs, and embarrassing pictures are circulated among
a wide audience of peers with a few clicks.”34
As technology changes and becomes more pervasive, the
effects of cyberharassment will too, and the law should grow to
include these new forms of harassment. Laws must not be so
narrowly constructed as to accidently exclude any potentially
harassing conduct. Indeed, the possibilities for communication—
30

Joanna Lee Mishler, Cyberstalking: Can Communication Via the Internet
Constitute a Credible Threat, and Should an Internet Service Provider Be Liable
If It Does?, Comment, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 115
(2000) (noting that cyberstalking can take place “in public forums, rather than
personal email” and that traditional anti-stalking laws should therefore “be
modified to accommodate activity on the Internet”).
31
Lipton, supra note 23, at 108.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 109.
34
Amy Harmon, Internet Gives Teenage Bullies Weapons to Wound from
Afar, N.Y. T IMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1.
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and thus the possibilities for cyberharassment—via the Internet are
so numerous that it is virtually impossible to name them all, and
new apps are emerging every day.
Attempts to list the ways in which cyberharassment could
be conducted is not limited to the legal academy. The legislature
and groups that promote particular public policies often adopt
similar approaches. The National Conference of State Legislatures
offers one such definition: “Cyberharassment usually pertains to
threatening or harassing email messages, instant messages, or blog
entries or websites dedicated solely to tormenting an individual.”35
A similar attempt to achieve clarity through specificity also
emerges in the statutes that we examined in Part II.B.2.36 The
statutes are either silent as to what communication means or else
attempt to make an inclusive list of the types of communication are
included.
What is missing from the literature is a focused
examination of what we mean when we discuss “communication”
on the Internet. While not every cyberharassment statute in
existence uses the word communication, those that do not
generally impose a similar requirement using slightly different
language, and the concept of communication is integral to
determining what conduct we find worthy of criminalization. For
example, someone who writes a lengthy series of disparaging and
violent comments about another person online, but does so in a
forum where the other person is virtually certain never to see it—
say, in a private google document shared with no one else—no
information has been transmitted to the subject of the speech, and
we doubt that many people would view the speech in question as
worthy of criminalization.
35

State Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Jan.
12,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/cyberstalking-and-cyberharassment-laws.aspx. Despite having been
updated 2 months prior to the writing of this Article, this definition is notably
lacking considerations of apps. For example, the example in the introduction,
where Elizabeth Long was told, “to stop bitching about how she almost killed
herself and go ahead and do it,” would not be covered under this definition as
those were posts on a community forum in an app.
36
See infra.
OF
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By focusing on communication, we capture what is wrong
with cyberharassment, cyberstalking, and cyberbullying—that the
target finds out about the speech and subsequently experiences
fear, disruption, and emotional distress. These are the harms
against which statutes that criminalize threats and other speech are
designed to protect.37 As Justice O’Connor explained in Virginia v.
Black:
The speaker need not actually intend to carry out
the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats
“protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence”
and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in
addition to protecting people “from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur.”38
Understanding the ways that people communicate on the Internet,
and importing that understanding into our cyberharassment
statutes, is critical to addressing the harms caused by
cyberharassment.
B. Internet Interaction
This section develops a typology of the myriad of ways that
people communicate online and explains which categories should
count as “communication.” We divide online communication into
five categories based on whether and how the target of the
communication would know of the existence of a particular
instance of Internet behavior.39 While our specific contemporary
examples—Facebook, Twitter, and so forth—will eventually
become outdated as technology changes, the categories themselves
are designed to be sufficiently flexible to evolve with the ways
people communicate over time.

37

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 459–60 (2003).
Id.
39
We use the word “behavior” so as to encompass both speech and other
forms of online activity. For example, hacking into someone’s Facebook
account could likely count as means of communicating with that person, but the
word speech is somewhat inapt.
38
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Today, people interact online in myriad ways. Technology
allows people to engage in a wide variety of activities that include
simultaneously sharing information with many friends,
acquaintances, or other contacts; engaging with websites by
making comments or posting original content; instant messaging;
and professional and social networking. Various apps allow
specialized types of communication—for example, some allow
people to track their friends’ location,40 while others provide an
anonymous forum for communication related to a particular
institution of higher education.41 People communicate on the
Internet to perform their work functions, complete their school
assignments, keep in touch with family, meet potential romantic
partners, socialize with new and existing acquaintances, and
virtually every other purpose of human interaction. At the touch of
a button, the Internet enables us to get in touch with almost
anyone, anywhere on the planet, almost instantaneously.
Social networking is an increasingly popular subset of
online interaction. Many social networking apps reach over 1
million users in less than six months from their launch dates.42
Some of the top social media websites have over 200,000,000
users, including Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, and Instagram.43
According to Facebook’s website, “people use Facebook to stay
connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in

Apps – Find My Friends, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/apps/find-myfriends/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). See also Jonny Evans, iOS7: Making Find
My Friends Useful and Less Creepy, COMPUTER WORLD (May 1, 2014),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2476314/apple-ios/ios-7--making-findmy-friends-useful-and-less-creepy.html
41
YIK YAK, http://www.yikyakapp.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). Who
Spewed that Abuse? Yik Yak Isn’t Telling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/technology/popular-yik-yak-app-confersanonymity-and-delivers-abuse.html.
42
Alyson Shontell, Here's How Long It Took 15 Hot Startups To Get
1,000,000
Users,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Jan.
8,
2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/one-million-users-startups-2012-1?op=1.
43
Shea Bennett, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, Vine, Snapchat – Social Media
Stats 2014, SOCIALTIMES (June 9, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/socialmedia-statistics-2014/499230.
40
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the world, and to share and express what matters to them.”44
Facebook has over 1.25 billion monthly users.45
On Facebook, users can be “Facebook friends,” which
allows them access to one another’s information, pictures, and
Internet posts. Users can privately message one another when they
are Facebook friends or without being Facebook friends. Users can
link their posts to their Facebook friends by tagging the Facebook
friend’s username. This alerts the Facebook friend that someone
has posted about them. Given the popularity of Facebook, we will
use the website’s different communication options as the primary
examples for each category of communication, though the
categories are by no means limited to Facebook and similar
websites.
Category 1: Direct
Direct communication occurs when a speaker sends
information directly to the target of the communication. On
Facebook, a personal message from the speaker to another user
would be in this category. Other forums that use direct person-toperson communication include email, personal messages on
Google, personal messages on LinkedIn, direct tweets via
Twitter,46 and direct Snapchats.47
44

FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last
visited Mar. 18, 2015).
45
Id.; Emil Protalinski, Facebook Passes 1.23 Billion Monthly Active Users,
945 Million Mobile Users, and 757 Million Daily Users, NEXT WEB (Jan. 29,
2014),
http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2014/01/29/facebook-passes-1-23billion-monthly-active-users-945-million-mobile-users-757-million-daily-users/.
46
A user can tweet directly to another user by starting their message with
“@” and then the other person’s username. For example, a tweet can be sent
directly to President Obama (or, at least, to a staffer who is manning his twitter
account) simply by beginning the message with “@BarackObama.” The tweet
will appear in other users’ news feeds if they follow both the sender and
President Obama. Users who do not follow both parties can still find and view
the tweet by performing a variety of searches, but it will not automatically
appear in their news feeds.
47
Snapchat allows users to send photos directly to another user by using
their phone’s contacts or by entering a username. Snapchat Support: Finding
and Adding Friends, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/a/find-friends
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
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Category 2: Tagging
Tagging communication occurs when the speaker takes
action to call the communication to the attention of the target. A
Facebook example within this category occurs when a user who
creates a public post and then attaches the username of a Facebook
friend. The “tagged” target receives an automatic notice of the
communication by the website. At that point, other users can also
see that the target was tagged by the speaker.
Other forums that use tagging communication include
Instagram, Vine, Twitter, and LinkedIn. Each of these websites
alerts the targets that the speaker tagged them either in a public
post or in a post that is visible to the target. The method by which
the speaker tags the target is by using an “@” symbol before the
name of the target. This triggers the automatic notification to the
target.
Category 3: Mutual Forum
Mutual Forum communication does not alert the target that
the speaker has posted information about them. Instead, it relies on
the fact that the speaker and target are both users of the same
online forum and are reasonably likely to see one another’s posts
during routine usage of the forum. On Facebook, communication
in this category would occur if the speaker and the target were
Facebook friends, but the speaker did not tag the target of the
online post. Because the speaker and the target were using the
same forum (Facebook), it is likely that the target would see the
post herself. Additionally, if the speaker and the target were both
members of the same Facebook group, it is likely that the target
would see a post the speaker made on that group’s page.
Other social networking websites that allow users to be
linked within the forum include LinkedIn, Twitter, Instagram,
Vine, and Snapchat. In each of these forums, the target is likely to
see postings about themselves because the speaker and target are
connected by their association through the social networking
website.
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Category 4: Likely Discovery
Discovery-based communication does not require the
speaker and the target of a particular online post to be users of the
same forum. On Facebook, for example, the “Discovery” category
would include situations in which the speaker and the target are not
Facebook friends. In such situations Tagging communication could
not occur because people have to be Facebook friends in order to
tag one another—therefore, the target would not receive an
automatic alert from the website about the speaker’s post.
Likewise, the speaker and subject are not using the same forum
because they are not Facebook friends, making Mutual Forum
communication impossible.
Yet the speaker might still know of or recklessly disregard
a substantial likelihood that the subject would discover the speech,
enabling what we have dubbed Discovery communication. For
example, if the speaker and the target have mutual acquaintances
in real life, and the speaker is Facebook friends with many of these
real-life acquaintances, then the speaker may have exhibited
reckless disregard that the subject would learn about the
communications. Indeed, even if the target did not use Facebook at
all, the post about the subject could still fall into this category.
Similarly, if the speaker knows that the target has a google alert on
her name—perhaps because the target has experienced online
harassment and abuse in the past, and because the target has
written a blog post about using google alerts that the speaker has
read—and the speaker still chooses to post threatening comments
about the speaker in a forum that he knows a google alert will pick
up, this is also a way of communicating with the target.
Factors that make the target more likely to discover the
communication include: speaker’s knowledge that the target uses
the forum; speaker’s knowledge that people close to the target use
the forum; knowledge that the target has a Google or mention alert
on her name48; or knowledge that the target frequents the forum—

48

A Google alert to a sends email notifications any time that Google finds a
new posting about any selected topic on the internet. So if someone places a
Google alert on their name, it allows people to learn when content including
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such as a public blog—if that forum does not require user
registration. The inquiry is not a mechanical one; the question is
simply whether, taking into account all the relevant circumstances,
the speaker knew of or recklessly disregarded a substantial
likelihood that the target would find out about the communication.
Category 5: Discovered in Fact
This category contains online speech or behavior by the
speaker that the target did in fact find out about, but that does not
fall into any of the first four categories. Speech in this category
might include public comments on a website that the speaker has
no reason to know the target reads, or posts on a social networking
forum that the speaker has no way of knowing the target uses. It
might include speech on the so-called “dark net,” where many sites
are difficult to access and do not appear with a simple Internet
search. It might include speech on protected social media accounts
to which neither the target nor any of the target’s acquaintances
have access. That is, this category includes speech about the target
that the speaker would not have expected the target to learn about.
C. “Communication”
In our view, the first four categories of speech we discuss
in the previous section—Direct, Tagging, Mutual Forum, and
Likely Discovery—should all count as communication for
purposes of cyberharassment statutes. The first two categories are
relatively straightforward. If a speaker sends a direct message to
her target, no matter whether she uses email, instant message,
Twitter direct messaging, and so forth, she demonstrates a desire to
call the content of the message to the target’s attention.49 Likewise,

their
name
is
posted
on
the
web.
GOOGLE
ALERTS,
https://www.google.com/alerts (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
49
In Elonis, for instance, the defendant made several posts as comments on
his ex-wife’s sister’s posts on Facebook. For example, when the sister posted:
“Halloween costume shopping with my niece and nephew should be
interesting,” Elonis commented, “Tell [their son] he should dress up as matricide
for Halloween. I don’t know what his comment would entail though. Maybe
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by tagging the target of a message, the speaker has taken
affirmative steps to ensure that the target receives the message. In
both situations, the speaker’s choice of medium clearly reveals a
desire for the target to learn about the message as well as the
decision to convey the message in a way that makes it likely that
the target will in fact learn about the message.
The third category—mutual forum communication—should
also count as “communication” for purposes of statutes
criminalizing cyberharassment. While the speaker has not taken
the same affirmative steps to draw the communication to the
targets attention as with person-to-person communication or
tagging communication, the choice of a mutual forum in itself
reveals the speaker’s intent and desire for the target to learn of the
harasser’s comments. That is: why would a speaker post something
on Facebook or LinkedIn—knowing that the target of the post also
uses the same forum—unless the speaker wanted the target to learn
about the communication?
The last form of communication—likely discovery of the
communication—should also count. This is the most attenuated
means of communication, but we believe that it is also culpable
conduct. If the speaker knows that the target of the communication
always reads a certain blog, or that she has a google alert on her
name that will pick up a comment about her, or that she has friends
who will alert her to a Facebook post—the speaker’s decision to
engage in the communication anyway is best understood as a
subtle means of drawing the target’s attention to the content of the
post. To exempt this category of communication would be to
provide an easy end-run around prosecution for speakers who wish
to torment or terrify their targets. The speaker can simply post in
such a way that they know the target will find about it—thereby
accomplishing the goal of disrupting the target’s life—yet can
evade prosecution by claiming that they used a public forum,
regardless whether they knew to a certainty that it was a forum
where the target would eventually discover the communication
This fourth category of communication is most neglected by
current statutes and judicial decision, and as a result we will focus
[Tara Elonis’s] head on a stick?” United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir.
2013).
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many of our recommendations on the ways statutes should be
amended to include this category. To do so is to engage in the
essential task of ensuring that our statutes actually reflect the
realities of the way people communicate on the Internet.
We do not believe that the final category—speech which
occurs online but does not rise to the level at which the speaker
disregarded a substantial likelihood that the target of the
communication would learn about it—should fall within the ambit
of cyberharassment statutes. If the subject of a communication
does in fact learn about a communication—but the author of the
communication would not reasonably have anticipated that the
subject would do so—it does not evince the intent to disrupt the
subject’s life in the same manner as the other four modes of
communication.
If a speaker has a tumblr,50 for example, that functions
mainly as a diary, and the tumblr is not well-read—for example, it
is not followed by any other tumblrs, it has never received any
reblogs,51 no one ever comments on the tumblr, and it appears very
low in google search results as the result of limited activity on the
page—then absent other circumstances, the author of the tumblr
would not expect the subject of a particular post to ever actually
read the post. If the subject did in fact learn about the post, and
experienced the disruption to her life that cyberharassment statutes
are designed to guard against, we acknowledge that possibility as
an unfortunate byproduct of the need to balance the importance of
effective cyberharassment statutes with the importance of not
convicting people for engaging in speech that they did not intend
to function as harassment, stalking, or bullying.
II. STATE CYBERCRIME LAW AND COMMUNICATION
This Part examines the way that communication is treated
within our current cyberharassment regime. We examine the way
50
Tumblr allows users to create their own blogs where they can post content
(“text, photos, quotes, links, music, and videos”). About, TUMBLR,
https://www.tumblr.com/about (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
51
A reblog occurs when one tumblr posts material that has already appeared
on another tumblr. Using the tumblr interface, this can be accomplished at the
touch of a button.
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that “communication” is statutorily defined and judicially
interpreted by presenting original empirical research, compiled in
Appendix A. Specifically, we survey cyberharassment and
cyberstalking statutes in all fifty states and federal law, then
summarizes the way these statutes have been interpreted by courts.
A. The Emerging Problem of Cyberharassment
Cyberharassment is a pervasive social problem. A recent
poll found that 73% of adults have witnessed someone else being
harassed online and 40% have personally experienced
harassment.52 Twenty-five percent of people had seen someone
physically threatened online, and 8% had personally experienced
online threats.53 Eighteen percent had seen someone be stalked, and
6% had been stalked themselves.54 In total, 18% of people had
been the targets of “more severe” forms of harassment such as
“being the target of physical threats, harassment over a sustained
period of time, stalking, and sexual harassment.”55 In particular,
young women ages 18-24 experience some of the more severe
types of harassment at disproportionately high levels: 26% of
women in that age range had been stalked online, and 25% had
been the targets of online sexual harassment.56 6% of students aged
12–18 reported that they had been victims of cyberbullying.57
These statistics are matched by anecdotes that reveal the
problematic nature of cyberharassment as well as its pervasiveness,
52

Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 14,
2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/online-harassment/.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. “The U.S. Department of Justice statistics suggest that 850,000
American adults—mostly women—are targets of cyber-stalking each year, and
40 percent of women have experienced dating violence delivered
electronically.” Marlisse Silver Sweeney, What the Law Can (and Can’t) Do
About
Online
Harassment,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
12,
2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/what-the-law-can-andcant-do-about-online-harassment/382638/.
56
Id.
57
Student Reports of Bullying and Cyber-Bullying: Results From the 2009
School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Aug. 2011), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011336.pdf.
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especially although not exclusively for women. In early 2014,
Amanda Hess chronicled the experience of a number of women on
the Internet who had received threats of violence and other serious
harm, including her own experience with a man on Twitter who
threatened to decapitate her and with law enforcement’s lackluster
response.58 Since Hess’s article, a number of other people—mostly
women—have shared similar experiences.59 A particularly
disturbing manifestation has emerged recently in the form of
GamerGate, in which several prominent women in the gaming
community have received threats of death and other violence.60
Indeed, one of us has substantial experience with online
harassment perpetrated by an anonymous individual she never
met.61 As Hess and others have explained, online harassment has
serious consequences, particularly for women:

Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PACIFIC
STANDARD (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/health-and-behavior/womenarent-welcome-internet-72170.
59
See, e.g., Jill Filipovic, Let’s Be Real: Online Harassment Isn’t Virtual for
Women,
TALKING
POINTS
MEMO
(Jan.
10,
2014),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/let-s-be-real-online-harassment-isn-t-virtualfor-women.
60
See, e.g., Jay Hathaway, What Is GamerGate, and Why? An Explainer for
Non-Geeks, GAWKER (Oct. 10, 2014), http://gawker.com/what-is-gamergateand-why-an-explainer-for-non-geeks-1642909080; Zoe Quinn, 5 Things I
Learned as the Internet’s Most Hated Person, CRACKED (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.cracked.com/blog/5-things-i-learned-as-internets-most-hatedperson/; Nick Wingfield, Feminist Critics of Video Games Facing Threats in
“Gamer
Gate”
Campaign,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/technology/gamergate-women-videogame-threats-anita-sarkeesian.html?_r=0; Brianna Wu, Why Gamer Gate Trolls
Won’t
Win,
THE
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Mar.
4,
2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2015/03/04/brianna-why-gamergatetrolls-won-win/l2V0PjfDRSf4Fm6F40i9YM/story.html; Brianna Wu, No Skin
Thick Enough: The Daily Harassment of Women in the Game Industry,
POLYGON
(July
22,
2014),
http://www.polygon.com/2014/7/22/5926193/women-gaming-harassment.
61
See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Identity and Ideas, FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS
(Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/11/identity-ideas/;
Nancy Leong, Anonymity and Abuse, FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS (Nov. 19,
2013),
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/11/anonymity-abuse/;
Nancy Leong
58

THIS PAPER IS UNDERGOING EDITING
AND REVISIONS. DO NOT QUOTE OR
CITE WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN
PERMISSION OF BOTH AUTHORS.

22

COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE

[01-Apr-15

But no matter how hard we attempt to ignore it, this
type of gendered harassment—and the sheer volume
of it—has severe implications for women’s status
on the Internet. Threats of rape, death, and stalking
can overpower our emotional bandwidth, take up
our time, and cost us money through legal fees,
online protection services, and missed wages.62
Given the seriousness of the harm caused by cyberharassment, an
effective legal response is important.
These personal stories have also provided powerful
evidence that in general law enforcement is poorly educated about
online harassment and ill-equipped to deal with most
cyberharassment63 Quantitative data show that cyberharassment is
quite rarely prosecuted—for example, Danielle Citron’s
examination of government data reveals only about twenty-five
online threat prosecutions per year64—and the host of recent threats
against several women made during GamerGate have yet to yield
any prosecution.65
Despite the pervasiveness of problematic online behavior,
online harassment that employs social media platforms is a new
problem for the courts. There are a few cases where the victim
, Privilege and Passivity, FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/12/privileging/; Nancy Leong,
Consequences and Conclusions, FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2013/12/consequences-conclusions/.
62
Hess, supra note 58.
63
Id.
64
Danielle Citron, Elonis v. United States and the Rarity of Threat
Prosecutions,
FORBES
(Dec.
3,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/03/united-states-v-elonisand-the-rarity-of-threat-prosecutions/.
65
Admittedly the failure to prosecute the people threatening Sarkeesian, Wu,
Quinn, and others is not solely attributable to existing laws. Much of the
harassment directed at them is clearly criminal under any definition, and the
issue is with tracking down the perpetrator electronically or, in some instances,
simply getting law enforcement to act. Other conduct, however, is more
ambiguous, and both high-profile targets like Sarkeesian, Wu, and Quinn as well
as non-famous individuals would benefit from clarification of legal elements
including the one we address here—the meaning of communication.
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finds success in the courtroom but usually only in instances of
severe harassment. The most common form of harassment that the
court holds to be cyberharassment is the public release of sexually
explicit photographs and videos of the victim.66 The courts are also
likely to find guilt where the harasser has released the victim’s
private information.67 It is rare that courts will find guilt where
there is only one instance of a harassing action or if that action is
not severe.68
Yet it should be noted that no matter how severe the
harassment, a court cannot take action if the statute is not properly
constructed to protect the victim. This can be a statute being found
unconstitutional.69 Or, what our Article focuses on, if the statute
does not have a clear definition of what it means to communicate.
66
See e.g., United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014) (defendant
made sexual Craiglist ads, Facebook accounts, and posted sexual acts of the
victim on pornography sites); United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir.
2014) (defendant created a false Facebook account featuring sexually explicit
photographs of the victim, and sent emails to the victim's co-workers and friends
also containing explicit photographs); People v. Kucharski, 996 N.E.2d 906 (Ill.
App. 2013) (defendant hacked his ex-girlfriend’s MySpace page and posted a
photo of her bending forward wearing only a thong and posted her phone
number and address).
67
In fact, the first cyberstalking conviction in California was based on the
release of personal information. The defendant “told numerous men everything
from the address of [the victim’s] apartment to her physical description, her
phone number and how to bypass her home security system.” Greg Miller &
David Maharaj, N. Hollywood Man Charged in 1st Cyber-Stalking Case, LOS
ANGELES
TIMES
(Jan.
22,
1999),
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jan/22/news/mn-523.
68
As an example of one success, the Ohio court found a defendant guilty
where she had posted one comment that the victim “molested a little boy.” State
v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). Notably Ohio had a very
expansive cyberharassment statute: “No person shall make or cause to be made a
telecommunication . . . with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another
person.” Id. (citing R.C. 2917.21(B)).
69
See, e.g., People v. Marquan, 19 N.E.3d 180 (N.Y. 2014) (defendant had
posted information about his classmates’ sexual practices on Facebook, but the
court held that the law was overbroad because it had “a wide array of
applications that prohibit types of protected speech far beyond the cyberbullying
of children”); U.S. v. Cassidy, 814 F.Supp.2d 574 (D. Md. 2011) (defendant had
made a twitter account and tweeted hundreds of messages about the victim and
was chaged under the interstate stalking statute, which was found to be an
unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech as applied to the defendant).
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For example, in People v. Barber, the defendant posted nude
photos of his ex-girlfriend online and sent those photos to her
employer, all without her consent.70 New York, as a state without a
cyberharassment statute with a reference to online communication,
charged Barber with aggravated harassment in the second degree. 71
While the court found Barber’s actions “reprehensible,” it was
unable to hold him accountable because the material was not
“communicated directly” with the victim.72 The court found it
insufficient that the victim saw that he had posted the photos
online and had seen the email to her employer.73
While statistics of cyberharassment trials, convictions, and
pleas are non-existent at the worst and incomplete at the best, it is
universally acknowledged that “it is a paltry number given the
estimated number of [cyberharassment] cases a year.”74 Both a
cause and a consequence of the lack of prosecution of
cyberharassment is that many important issues remain unaddressed
by the courts. As a result, law enforcement agencies may remain
unsure of what constitutes a crime and prosecutors may hesitate to
press charges, with the result that a great deal of problematic
online behavior remains unpunished. One element notably lacking
in clarity is the meaning of “communication,” which we address in
subsequent sections of this Article.

70
People v. Barber, 992 N.Y.S.2d 159 (2014). This phenomenon has become
known as “revenge porn,” where a person will post sexually explicit photos or
video of their ex-significant other, intending to publically humiliate them. See
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE
FOREST
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2368946.
71
Along with two other charges that were dismissed on other grounds.
Barber, 992 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Danielle Citron, United States v. Elonis and the Rarity of Threat
Prosecutions,
FORBES
(Dec.
03,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/12/03/united-states-v-elonisand-the-rarity-of-threat-prosecutions/.
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B. Criminalizing Cyberharassment
In this section, we evaluate the way that cyberharassment is
currently treated under criminal law. We first consider threshold
issues of constitutionality. We then present an original empirical
survey of state cyberharassment laws based on the way
communication is defined in those statutes, and discuss the way
that courts have interpreted these statutes.
1. Constitutionality
Cyberharassment statutes must survive constitutional
scrutiny. The Supreme Court maintains that “basic principles of
freedom of speech and press, like the First Amendment’s
command, do not vary when a new and different medium for
communication appears.”75 Nonetheless, the Court has also made
clear that developments in technology influence the appropriate
interpretation of constitutional rights.76 The First Amendment,
then, need not be intentionally blind to the real differences in the
way the Internet has changed the way we interact with one another.
This constitutional backdrop makes clear that
cyberharassment can be criminalized via carefully drawn statutes.
The Supreme Court has consistently classified emotionally
distressing or outrageous speech as protected, especially where that
speech touches on matters of political, religious or public
concern.77 But speech integral to criminal conduct is a longestablished category of unprotected speech.78 For example,
75

United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).
See, e.g., Riley v. California 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that police
may not execute a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to an arrest, and,
more generally, acknowledging evolving technology as consideration in
constitutional analysis); Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001). See also
[redacted], Constitutional Rights in the Digital Age, HUFFINGTON POST (July 19,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-leong/constitutional-rights-infirst-amendment_b_5601216.html.
77
United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014).
78
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 69 S. Ct. 684 (1949); Sayer, 748
F.3d at 425.
76
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“speech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is the
very vehicle of the crime itself” such as in crimes of perjury,
bribery, extortion and threats, and conspiracy.79 Likewise, when
speech contains “true threats,” as the speech criminalized by
cyberharassment statues often does, that speech is also
unprotected.80 Although the Supreme Court has never clearly
defined what a true threat is—it may do so this term in Elonis v.
United States81—lower courts have adopted a variety of tests.82
Challengers to cyberharassment statutes therefore raise two
primary arguments: (1) that the statute is void for vagueness; and
(2) that the statute violates the First Amendment by punishing
protected speech.
A criminal law may be unconstitutionally vague for either
of two independent reasons. First, the statute may fail to provide
the kind of notice that would enable a person of ordinary
intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited. Second, a
statute may fail to provide explicit standards for those who apply
it, thus authorizing or even encouraging arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.83 Invalidating vague statutes avoids:
punishing people for behavior that they could not have known was
illegal; subjective enforcement of laws based on arbitrary and

79

United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1970).
United States v. Watts, 349 U.S. 705 (1969).
81
Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 2819 (2014).
82
For example, some courts consider a series of factors in determining
whether speech constitutes a true threat, including (1) the reaction of the
recipient of the speech; (2) whether the threat was conditional; (3) whether the
speaker communicated the speech directly to the recipient; (4) whether the
speaker had made similar statements in the past; and (5) whether the recipient
had reason to believe the speaker could engage in violence. See, e.g., Jones v.
State of Arkansas, 64 S.W.3d 728, 735 (Ark. 2002) (determining that a student
giving his rap song threatening violence to another student was a true threat).
Other courts use a “reasonable person” test, explaining: “if a reasonable person
would foresee that an objective rational recipient of the statement would
interpret its language to constitute a serious expression . . . [then] the message
conveys a ‘true threat.’” U.S. v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 883 (1997).
83
People v. Kucharski, 996 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. 2013).
80
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discriminatory enforcement by government officers; and any
chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.84
The test for vagueness "is necessarily a practical rather than
hyper-technical one," and when a statute fails to provide an explicit
definition, the court may resort to ordinary meaning and common
sense, considering whether the statute "conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices."85
Analysis of the federal cyberstalking statute demonstrates
the way these constitutional principles play out in practice. The
statute prohibits “engaging in a course of conduct by use of
interactive computer services with the intent to kill injure, harass,
or intimidate another.”86 The federal cyberstalking statute is not
unconstitutionally vague because the statute provides sufficient
notice of the respective prohibitions and citizens need not guess
what terms such as “harass” and “intimidate” mean.87 Further, the
government is only required to show that the totality of the
defendant's conduct “evidenced a continuity of purpose” to achieve
the criminal end.88
For example, in United States v. Osinger, the defendant’s
threats, creation of a false Facebook page with sexually explicit
photographs of the victim, and emails to the victim's co-workers
and friends containing explicit photographs evinced the defendant's
"intent to . . . cause substantial emotional distress . . ."89 Thus, the
defendant's unrelenting harassment and intimidation of the victim

84

United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2012).
86
18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012).
87
Id.; Osinger, 753 F.3d at 939; United States v. Shepard, 12-10253, 2014
WL 2750117 (9th Cir. June 18, 2014); People v. Sucic, 928 N.E.2d 1231 (Ill.
App. 2010); United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014); United States
v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2004) (vacated on grounds unrelated
to constitutionality of cyberstalking statute).
88
The statute does not impose a requirement that the government prove that
each act was intended in isolation to cause serious distress or fear of bodily
injury to the victim. United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004);
Shrader, 675 F.3d at 300.
89
Osinger, 753 F.3d at 939.
85
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was not based on conduct that he "could not have known was
illegal" because of vagueness. 90
Complementing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Osinger,
New York and the Second Circuit have held that statues which
criminalize intentional communication with the intent to “alarm or
annoy” are unconstitutional on both freedom of speech and
vagueness grounds.91 In Vives v. City of New York, the court held
that determining what language would classify as alarming or
annoying was too vague because the determination would be rely
on the person receiving the communication.92
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held that any vagueness
associated with the word “annoy” was mitigated by the fact that
the meanings of “threaten” and “harass” can easily be ascertained
and have generally accepted meanings.93 The court suggests that
the words annoy, abuse, threaten or harass should be read together
to be given similar meanings.94
The Supreme Court has not addressed this specific
language issue. Lower courts, however, have either taken the
inclusion approach or have simply read the word “annoy” out of
the statute, holding that the remainder is sufficiently specific to
survive scrutiny.
A criminal law may violate the freedom of speech if it
restricts general speech that is not a “true threat” or “fighting
words.”95 The federal cyberstalking statute does not prohibit
protected speech because it is the conduct rather than the speech

90

Id.
People v. Golb, 23 N.Y.3d 455 (N.Y. 2014); Vives v. City of New York,
305 F. Supp. 2d 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
92
Additionally, the court found the intent to "annoy or alarm” to be protected
under the Constitution because communication that alarms or annoys does not
constitute fighting words or true threats and, therefore, that criminalizing such
speech is “utterly repugnant to the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.” Golb, 23 N.Y.3d at 455; Vives, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
93
Bowker, 372 F.3d at 365.
94
Id.
95
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (fighting words); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (true threats).
91
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that is prohibited.96 Most, if not all, of cyberharassment statutes’
legal applications are to conduct that is not protected by the First
Amendment.97 It is difficult to imagine what constitutionallyprotected speech would fall under the cyberharassment statutory
prohibitions because the statutes require both malicious intent on
the part of the defendant and substantial harm to the target.98
The federal cyberstalking statute specifically criminalizes
"a course of conduct that . . . causes . . . substantial emotional
distress" and provides "the term 'course of conduct' means a
pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts, evidencing a
continuity of purpose."99 Thus, the proscribed acts of
cyberharassment are tethered to the underlying criminal conduct
and not to speech.100 The element of a threat is also an integral part
of the offense of cyberharassment.101 Therefore, that element
narrows the punishable behavior such that the defendant must
"knowingly and without lawful justification" specifically intend to
"harass" the target by transmitting the threat.102
Only one federal district court case has held that the
indictment of a defendant under the federal cyberstalking statute
violated the First Amendment.103 In United States v. Cassidy, the
prosecution indicted an individual for tweets and blog posts that
were critical of a “well-known religious figure” and that
questioned the subject’s “character and qualifications as a religious
leader.”104 In the specific context of the particular indictment, the
court held that the indictment violated the First Amendment, but
explicitly declined to consider whether the cyberstalking statute
was facially invalid.105
96
“Intimidating conduct serves no legitimate purpose and merits no first
amendment protection.” State v. Hemmingway, 825 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. App.
2012).
97
Bowker, 372 F.3d at 365.
98
United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012).
99
18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A (emphasis added).
100
United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014).
101
Threats are not protections of the first amendment. People v. Sucic, 928
N.E.2d 1231 (Ill. App. 2010).
102
Id.
103
United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).
104
Id. at 583.
105
Id. at 587–88.
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Thus, cyberharassment and cyberstalking statutes can be
drafted in a manner that complies with the requirements of the
First Amendment. And, in general, the federal courts have found
that the federal cyberstalking statute is drafted in such a way.
2. Communication in cyberharassment statutes
This section examines the way that “communication” is
currently statutorily defined. All cyberharassment statutes have
three elements: intentional mens rea with respect to the making of
the communication, threatening or harassing communication, and
victim knowledge of the communication. We divided the current
statutes into five categories based on how communication is
statutorily defined. A chart containing all the statutes is appended
to this Article.106
Category 1: No Reference to Online Communication
Some states do not explicitly refer to online communication
in any criminal statutes. This is true in six states (Delaware, Maine,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York).
Category 2: Undefined “Electronic Communication”
Sixteen states (Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia)
criminalize threatening “electronic communication,” but do not
define that communication.107 In Category 2, only Florida, Rhode
Island and Virginia have separate “Cyberstalking” or “Harassment
106

See Appendix A.
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90.1 (2015); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.270 (2015);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-182b (2015); FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (2015); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 711-1106 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7906 (2015); IND. CODE
§ 35-45-2-2 (2015); IOWA CODE § 708.7 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.225
(2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07
(2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-1
(2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. 13 V.S. 1602
(2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.7:1 (2015).
107
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by Computer” statutes. All of the other states in Category 2 include
electronic communication within the “Harassment” or “Stalking”
statute.
Category 3: Statutorily-Specified Communication
Nine states (Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas,
Kentucky, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Washington, and West
Virginia) criminalize and define threatening electronic
communication with specific examples but omit many types of
communication in the definition. For example, Arizona defines
electronic communication as only “a wire line, cable, wireless or
cellular telephone call, a text message, an instant message or
electronic mail.”108
Category 4: All Direct Victim Communication:
Twelve states (California, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming) and federal law define
threatening communication to include all types of communication,
but require that the threatening language be directed at a particular
target.109 What it means for the language to be directed at a person
varies from state to state.
For example, Louisiana defines electronic communication
as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in part by wire,
radio, computer, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical
system, use of the Internet, a computer, a facsimile machine, a
pager, a cellular telephone, a video recorder, or other electronic
108

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (2015).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (2015);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653m (West 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3 (2015);
MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Law § 3-805 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS 265 § 43
(2015); MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (2015);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211 (West
2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1172 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065 (2015);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-308; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (2015); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (2015).
109
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means.”110 This communication must, however, be “sent to a
person identified by a unique address or address number and
received by that person.”111
Other state statutes take a similar approach. For example,
Mississippi criminalizes all types of electronic mail or electronic
communication “with another, repeatedly, whether or not
conversation ensues.”112 Similarly, although Wyoming does not
have a separate cyberstalking statute, it
criminalizes
“communicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a
communication with another person by verbal, electronic,
mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic or written means directed at a
specific person” in its stalking statute.113
Category 5: Reasonable Victim’s Knowledge of Communication
Seven states (Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, South Carolina, and Wisconsin) have stalking or
harassment statutes that do not require a statement to be made
directly to the person.114 Instead, they criminalize any statement
made that would cause a reasonable recipient to feel threatened.
For example, Nevada criminalizes any “display or distribute of
information in a manner that substantially increases the risk of
harm or violence to the victim.”115 Similarly, although Minnesota
does not have a separate cyberstalking statute, the stalking statute
criminalizes “any communication made through any available
technologies or other objects which the actor knows or has reason
to know would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel
frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated”116
Category 5 is different from Category 1 because the language of
110

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3 (2015).
Id.
112
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (2015).
113
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506 (2015) (emphasis added).
114
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-217 (2015); ILL. COMP. STAT. 720 ILCS 5/127.5 (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.411s (2015); MINN. STAT. § 609.749
(2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.575 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700
(2015); WIS. STAT. § 947.0125 (2015).
115
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.575 (2015).
116
MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (2015).
111
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the statutes in Category 1 does not include online communication
and the language of the statutes in Category 5 explicitly does.
3. Communication in cyberharassment cases
This section explains how courts have defined the phrase
“communication” in cases involving online behavior. Just as
different cyberstalking statutes define communication differently,
case law defining communication varies based on the statutory
requirements.
All courts have held that emails sent to the target satisfy the
requirement of “direct communication with the victim.”117
Moreover, that an Internet message can be a “true threat” not
protected by First Amendment without being sent directly to
victim.118
In New York, a state court has gone a step further and held
that messages in a newsgroup, similar to a blog, also qualified as a
direct communication. In People v. Munn, the defendant posted a
message to kill a police sergeant and all other members of the
NYPD.119 The message was in a “newsgroup,” posted daily and
read by a group of regular participants, but open to be read by
anyone with a computer and “on line” capabilities.120 The court
found that defendant’s posting on an Internet newsgroup with the
complainant's name included then transformed the communication
to one not only intended for the general public, but specially
generated to be communicated to the complainant.121 Therefore,
the court found that communications in a public newsgroup

117

However, Florida held changing email password and appropriating emails
is not cyberstalking because it is not electronic communication directed at the
victim, as required by the statute. Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2012).; M.G. v. C.G., 862 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2008); People v.
Munn, 688 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999); Barson v. Com., 726 S.E.2d
292 (Va. 2012) (reversed on other grounds).
118
People v. Diomedes, 13 N.E.3d 125, (Ill. App. 2014); see also Elonis v.
United States, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819
(2014).
119
People v. Munn, 688 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Crim. Ct. 1999).
120
Id.
121
Id.
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message is considered written communication directed at the
person for purposes of harassment.122
But other courts’ failure to use a definition of
communication that reflects the way people actually use the
Internet results in a failure to convict individuals who have clearly
engaged in online behavior that terrorized their victims.
In State v. Ellison, for example, a case arising in Ohio, the
defendant posted a picture of the target to MySpace with a caption
that the target liked to molest little boys.123 The MySpace post was
available to the public but not sent directly to the target.124 The
relevant Ohio statute prohibited “telecommunication with the
purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person,”125 and before
the trial court, the defendant was convicted of “Harassment by
Telecommunication.”126
On appeal, however, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined
that “the statute creates a specific-intent crime: the state must
prove the defendant’s specific purpose to harass.”127 The court held
that direct contact with the target was not necessary, but that the
state must prove the intent of the defendant was to harass the
target.128 The defendant claimed, and the court agreed that the
intent of the defendant was to warn the public of the target’s
character and not to harass the target.129 The court reversed the
conviction.130
Ellison reveals a misplaced focus on the intent of the
defendant rather than—in keeping with the purpose of
cyberharassment statutes in general, which is to avoid disruption
and fear in innocent citizens’ lives—a focus on whether a
threatening or severely distressing message was communicated to
the target. Such communication should be the focus: after all, the

122

Id.
State v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio App. 2008).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
123
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point of cyberharassment statutes is to prevent the harms arising
from such communication.
In other situations, prosecutors have simply declined to
press charges because of the inadequate statutory tools available to
them. In September of 2006, Lori Drew became concerned that
Megan Meier, a 13 year old neighbor, was spreading rumors about
her daughter. Drew created a false MySpace account in the name
of “Josh Evans.”131 Drew used the MySpace account pretend to be
a 16-year-old boy and flirt with Meier.132 “Josh Evans” began
sending Meier negative messages on October 15 and continuing
throughout the next day. On October 16, 2006, “Josh Evans” sent
Meier a message to the effect that the world would be a better
place without her.133 Additional MySpace members whose profiles
reflected links with the “Josh Evans” profile also began to send
Meier disparaging messages.134 Subsequently, Meier's mother
discovered that her daughter had hanged herself in her bedroom
closet.135 Missouri prosecutors did not press charges because they
could not prove Drew intended to cause emotional distress.136 Yet
again, this focus is misplaced. The disruption to Meier’s life is the
harm that the statute is intended to prevent, and as a result the
focus of the prosecution should remain on the nature of the
communication.137
131

The Story of Megan Meier, MEGAN MEIER FOUNDATION,
http://www.meganmeierfoundation.org/megans-story.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2015).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Prosecutor: No Criminal Charges in MySpace Suicide, FOXNEWS (Dec.
03, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/03/prosecutor-no-criminalcharges-in-myspace-suicide/.
137
A similar example of unprosecuted cyberharassment occurred in Tampa,
Florida in 2012. There, an ex-mistress, Paula Broadwell sent anonymous
threatening emails to the wife of the person with whom she was had an affair. In
the emails, Broadwell touted her military background in a threatening manner
and boasted of having “powerful” friends. Matthew Lysiak, Menacing Emails
Sent by David Petraeus’ Ex-Mistress Paula Broadwell to Socialite Jill Kelley
Promised to Make the Apparent Rival ‘Go Away,’ DAILYNEWS (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/broadwell-emails-kelley-sinisterpreviously-reported-article-1.1204956. The target saw the emails as death
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Finally, the recent passage of statutes that strive to
criminalize the phenomenon known as “revenge porn” also reveal
the deficiencies in current cyberharassment statutes.138 Revenge
porn—more accurately known as non-consensual pornography—
consists of online posting of nude pictures of another person
without that person’s consent.139 Often, although not always, the
person who posts the pictures is an angry ex-partner.140 Some
websites exist solely for the purpose of posting non-consensual
pornography.141 Posting such pictures is often a mechanism of
communication: for example, the website MyEx.com invites users
to post links to the email address, phone number, Facebook page,
LinkedIn page, and other information of people depicted in
uploaded photos.142 The inevitable result is that other users often
send threatening and harassing messages to the person depicted in
the photos, with the result that the person depicted finds out about
the pictures and, often, realizes who uploaded them. In many
instances, it is difficult to imagine a clearer way to communicate
hatred or contempt to the person depicted in the photos. Yet the
threats, specifically one in which Broadwell vowed to “make [her] go away.”
But prosecutors never filed charges, again because of the focus on intent rather
than the focus on communication and the disruption it causes. Paula Broadwell
Won’t Face Cyberstalking Charges in Petraeus Scandal, NBCNEWS (Dec. 18,
2012), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/18/15995676-paulabroadwell-wont-face-cyberstalking-charges-in-petraeus-scandal.
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See, e.g., MyEx.com Get Revenge! Naked Pics of Your Ex, MYEX.COM,
http://www.myex.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). Another popular site,
IsAnybodyUp.com, averaged 30 million views a month at its peak. Daniel
Kreps, Revenge-Porn Site Owner Hunter Moore Pleads Guilty, Faces Prison
Time, ROLLINGSTONE (Feb. 20, 2015). IsAnybodyUp.com shut down in 2012, as
a result of intense public pressure. Id. Note that while the website founder was
indicted and eventually pled guilty, it was not on charges related specifically to
the protection of revenge-porn victims, “as many states’ cyber-laws still haven’t
been revamped to confront the relatively new phenomenon.” Jessica Roy,
Revenge-Porn King Hunter Moore, the ‘Most Hated Man on the Internet,’ Is
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(Feb.
19,
2015),
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http://www.myex.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
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fact that cyberharassment statutes fail to cover posting such
pictures reveals the shortcomings of such statutes and their
inadequate focus on communication.
III. UPDATING THE MEANING OF “COMMUNICATION”
This Part first briefly articulates the problems associated
with the lack of a clear and up-to-date statutory definition of
“communication.” It then proposes a definition that can be used by
both legislatures and courts, and offers concrete examples that
demonstrate why the definition is sensible.
A. Statutory Proposal
As we have explained, the myriad ways in which people
interact on the Internet require a careful and accurate definition of
“communication” in cyberharassment statutes. As we have argued,
such a definition should include any form of online behavior that a
reasonable person knew or recklessly disregarded a reasonable
likelihood that the target would learn about the behavior.
Currently, many cyberharassment statutes—including the
federal statute—define cyberharassment around the “use” of an
electronic communications device to engage in a “course of
conduct.” We think that rephrasing the statute and others like it to
criminalize communication that warrants punishment correctly
places the focus on the interaction between the speaker and the
target.
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We propose the following language to describe the
interaction between the speaker and the target:
An
individual
commits
the
crime
of
cyberharassment when he or she knowingly and
repeatedly engages in online communication about
the target in a manner that a reasonable person
would find threatening or would cause severe
emotional distress, and that the target did in fact
find threatening or severely emotionally distressing.
(a) “Communication” is defined as speech or
conduct using any electronic medium when the
individual knew or recklessly disregarded a
substantial likelihood that the target would learn
about the speech or conduct;
(b) “Repeatedly” means more than once.
The first part of the statute closely tracks the language in existing
cyberharassment statutes whose constitutionality courts have
upheld. By requiring that the speech is either threatening or
severely emotionally distressing, the statute avoids criminalizing
speech that is merely annoying or disparaging—that is, it focuses
on speech whose prohibition, as Justice O’Connor articulated in
Virginia v. Black, “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence”
and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in addition to
protecting people “from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur.”143
Key to our project is section (a), which defines
communication. We employ a definition that includes only speech
or conduct when the perpetrator either knew there was a substantial
likelihood that the target would find out about the speech or
conduct, or recklessly disregarded a substantial likelihood that the
target would find out about the speech. This definition goes to the
heart of the harms caused by threatening or distressing
communications on the Internet: if the perpetrator knows or
disregards a substantial likelihood that the target will find out
about a particular instance of online behavior, the behavior is
143

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 459–60 (2003).
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closely akin to the type of direct communication (letters; phone
calls) that were criminalized in the pre-Internet world. In the next
section, we explain how our statute—and its careful definition of
communication—will apply to a range of behavior on the Internet.
B. Examples
Finally, we turn to the task of articulating how our
proposed definition of communication would play out in the
context of several examples spanning a range of social media
platforms. In each instance, we demonstrate that the speaker knew
or recklessly disregarded the reasonable likelihood that the subject
would learn of the speech, and, therefore, that the activity should
count as communication. We demonstrate not only that the test
works across existing platforms, but also that it can accommodate
new platforms as well.
Example 1: Allison is friends with Brenda on Facebook. Allison
writes a post about Brenda on Facebook that is visible to all of
Allison’s Facebook friends.
This example qualifies as communication under our
definition. Even if Allison does not tag Brenda in the post, people
often see their friends’ posts on Facebook while browsing their
news feeds—the average American now spends forty minutes a
day on Facebook,144 and some check far more frequently.145
Additionally, Allison and Brenda’s mutual friends would likely
inform Brenda of the post, or ask her questions about it, if the post
was at all interesting or salacious. In the unlikely event that Allison
believed that Brenda would not find out about the post, Allison
144

Joshua Brustein, Americans Now Spend More Time on Facebook Than
they
Do
on
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Pets,
BLOOMBERG
(July
23,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-07-23/heres-how-much-timepeople-spend-on-facebook-daily.
145
Stephen Marche, Is Facebook Making Us Lonely?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/05/is-facebookmaking-us-lonely/308930/ (“Among 18-to-34-year-olds, nearly half check
Facebook minutes after waking up, and 28 percent do so before getting out of
bed.”).

THIS PAPER IS UNDERGOING EDITING
AND REVISIONS. DO NOT QUOTE OR
CITE WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN
PERMISSION OF BOTH AUTHORS.

40

COMMUNICATION IN CYBERSPACE

[01-Apr-15

would have had to recklessly disregard the time and manner in
which most people use Facebook, as well as the likelihood that
mutual friends would alert Brenda of the post’s existence. A post
made with such reckless disregard should count as communication.
Example 2: Cesar and Dave are not friends on Facebook, but they
have many mutual Facebook friends. Cesar writes a post about
Dave.
This example likewise qualifies as communication. Even
though Dave may never see the Facebook posting himself, the
many mutual friends of Cesar and Dave would make it likely that
Dave would find out about it. On Facebook, it is easy to tell how
many mutual friends one shares with another person, regardless
whether one is friends with that person. Thus, Cesar would have to
recklessly disregard the readily-available information that he and
Dave had multiple mutual friends in order to believe that none of
the mutual friends would alert the subject to the communication.
Example 3: Ed writes one post about Frida on Reddit.
Reddit is a website that bills itself as “the front page of the
Internet.”146 It is divided into a large number of forums, all of
which are publicly accessible and in any of which anyone can
write a post of any length. The site constantly updates itself,
making certain content more visible or less visible depending on
the number of views the content has received and the time since
the posting. All posts are publicly available until the post is
removed by the creator.
If Ed writes one post about Frida on Reddit, his post should
not count as communication because it is a single incident and
Frida is unlikely to find out about it. If the isolated post is the only
thing Ed has ever written about Frida, neither Frida nor people
close to her would have any reason to be on alert for a posting
about her. Further, if Ed’s post was the only thing he had written
about Frida, it is unlikely that even if someone close to Frida saw
146

Reddit: The Front Page of the Internet, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com
(last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
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the blog that they would tell her about it. In this instance, Ed has
not recklessly disregarded a reasonable likelihood that Frida would
find out about the Reddit post.
Example 4: Gary creates a blog dedicated to writing disparaging
and threatening posts about Holden.
Anyone with access to the Internet can create a blog. While
some blogs cost money to create and maintain, many platforms,
such as Tumblr, Blogspot, and Blogger, allow people to create
blogs for free. The settings on a particular blog may allow
comments from viewers, or the blog may exist only as a forum for
the author of the blog. While blogs may be public or private, a
public blog can be viewed by anyone and the posts are available
until they are taken down by the owner of the blog.
A blog dedicated to negative commentary about Holden
should count as communication so long as the blog is public. Most
people google themselves occasionally in order to know what is on
the Internet about them. Some even have google or mention alerts
on their names. And other people—potential dates; potential
employers—likewise google people. Given all of these possible
avenues for learning about the blog via Internet searches, Gary’s
creation of the blog about Holden should count as communication
because it is reasonably likely that Holden would find out about
the blog.
Example 5: Ida creates a Craigslist ad that includes Jaliah’s
phone number and address and states that Jaliah is willing to have
sex for money.
Craigslist is a website that allows anyone to post an ad that
is made available to the public online. The website categorizes the
postings by topic, such as “For Sale,” “Wanted,” “Housing,”
“Casual Encounters,” and so forth. The ads are visible to anyone
on the Internet, although in some instances they expire after a
specified length of time such as a week. Posts often include contact
information for the party who has (supposedly) created the
advertisement.
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Ida’s Craigslist posting about Jaliah counts as
communication. Even though Jaliah might not find the Craigslist
posting herself, the posting itself would solicit responses from
those who do see it. Jaliah would likely find out about the posting
from people who call her on the phone or even come to her house.
Ida’s posting of Jaliah’s contact information would establish
knowledge by Ida of a reasonable likelihood that Jaliah would be
contacted and, therefore, that Jaliah would discover the posting.
Example 6: Keith and Leah both use Twitter. Keith writes several
public tweets about Leah threatening to harm her and her family.
He mentions Leah by her full name but does not include her
Twitter handle. Keith and Leah each have about 500 Twitter
followers, but they do not have any Twitter followers in common.
While this is a close case, we believe that this example
should qualify as communication. Admittedly Keith has not used
the “@” symbol to call Leah’s attention to his tweets, and the lack
of mutual followers diminishes the likelihood that anyone will
mention the tweets to Leah. With that said, there are a number of
ways that Leah could find out about the tweets, such that she is
reasonably likely to do so and the tweets should count as
communication. Given that the tweets are public, Leah could find
the tweets by googling her name. She could also find them by
using Twitter’s search function to search for her name. If the
tweets are threatening, it is possible that one of Keith’s twitter
followers would reach out to Leah and alert her to the tweets. And,
as in Example 4, another person might google Leah’s name, find
the tweets, and let Leah know the tweets exist.
Example 7: Mike creates a Snapchat video threatening Nick. Mike
is not friends with Nick or any people who know Nick.
Snapchat is a cell phone application that allows users to
post photos and videos within the application. Other users who
also have the application can view the videos and photos of people
from their phone contact list. No one can view a user’s photo or
video without the user having the viewer’s phone number. All
photos and videos are available at most for 24 hours from the time
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of posting. Each photo or video may be viewed multiple times
within the allotted time period.
The Snapchat video should not count as communication.
First, Nick would be very unlikely to see the video himself.
Because Snapchat users are friends through cell phone numbers,
the only people that would have access to the Snapchat video
would be Mike’s close friends who have his cell phone number.
Additionally, Snapchat videos expire and are inaccessible after 24
hours. This further decreases the likelihood that Nick will find out
about the video. Thus, this should not count as communication.
Indeed, even if Nick did in fact find out about the video through
some unusual set of circumstances, Mike did not disregard a
reasonable likelihood that he would do so, and thus the test for
communication is not satisfied.
CONCLUSION
New technology creates new ways of interacting and
requires a more robust definition of communication. Here, we have
established a definition of communication that addresses existing
means of online interaction and can adapt to new ones.
Incorporating this definition of communication into statutes
criminalizing cyberharassment will improve the efficacy of those
statutes at detecting and punishing problematic online behavior
that rises to a level that society deems worthy of criminal sanction.
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